Talk:Deontology

Teleology or deontology

Requesting comments in search of consensus on the correct definition of deontology and whether divine command theory and the non-aggression principle meet that definition. --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:37, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

I would like the raise the -q*uestion whether or not the two parts on 'The Divine Command Theory' and the 'Non Agression Theory'. Are Deontology. Since both are commands they are vitues and hence teleological. I would like to propose to move them to the teleological ethics page, or at the very least mention that there is a discussion on this matter and place them on both deon and telos pages. (talk) 14:19, 5 July 2010 (UTC)

You seem somewhat confused about what constitutes deontological, teleological (or consequentialist), and aretaic (virtue-based) ethical theories. Deontological theories are ones that say (roughly put) that some action is right or wrong just in and of itself, not because of any effects of it on the world (consequentialist) or anything it reflects of the character of the person performing it (aretaic). Divine Command Theory and Non-Agression Theory both say to do or not do certain things just because those things are right or wrong in themselves, just because it is your duty to act that way (to obey the commands of God, or to refrain from aggression), without any appeal to consequences or character. That makes them clearly deontological theories. --Pfhorrest (talk) 00:09, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

Hi Pfhorrest, virtue ethics is teleology because it has a rulebase: a list of do's and don't's (confusing spelling...is this correct?). Since no violence is a rulebase (and divine command as well) it is teleology. Naming the things in the rulebase 'duty' does not change the fact that, since it is a rule to be obeyed no matter what, this is a goal. That is never deontology I believe. DO you see my point? --Faust (talk) 00:30, 6 July 2010 (UTC)

Virtue ethics is absolutely not teleology, nor does an ethical theory having a rulebase make it virtue ethics. You seem very confused about what these different categories mean.

There are three types of normative ethical theory:

• Aretaic (or "virtue ethics") theories are those which prescribe or proscribe actions on the basis of how they reflect upon or affect the character of the person acting. So things that good people do, and thinks that will make you a good person, are what aretaic theories say you should do. The character of the people doing the actions are what are intrinsically good, according to these theories. For example, an aretaic theory might prescribe some action because it would be brave for a person to act that way, and bravery is a virtue, so it must be good to act in that brave way; regardless or what that brave action may be (even if a deontologist might call it "wrong", e.g. it violates someone's rights) or what consequences it might have (even if a consequentialist would call them "bad", e.g. it makes people unhappier on the whole).
• Deontological theories are those which prescribe or proscribe actions based on some inherent quality of the actions themselves, regardless of their reflection or impact on the actor's character or on any external consequences they may have. Deontological theories say to do this and don't do that because it's just right (or just wrong) inherently to do that. This is why divine command theory and the non-aggression principle are deontological: they say that it's just inherently right to obey the commands of God, or just inherently wrong to aggress upon another person, no matter what doing or not doing such might say about your as a person (even if a virtue ethicist may say it reflects poorly of your character, e.g. it is cowardly) and no matter what the consequences of it may be (even if a consequentialist would call them "bad", e.g. it makes people unhappier on the whole).
• Consequentialist (or "teleological") theories are those which prescribe or proscribe actions based on the consequences of those actions. Certain states of affairs are what are inherently good, according to these theories, and whatever actions bring about those states of affairs are good, and whichever destroy those states of affairs are bad. So for example, a consequentialist theory may say that happiness is inherently good, and so whatever brings the most happiness to the most people is the right thing to do, no matter what that action may be (even if a deontologist might call it "wrong", e.g. it violates someone's rights) or how it may reflect upon or impact your character (even if a virtue ethicist may say it reflects poorly of your character, e.g. it is cowardly).

--Pfhorrest (talk) 23:57, 3 September 2010 (UTC)

Yeah, I got your take on things. I think you are incorrect on several points though:

1. Consequentionalism is utilitarianism and not teleology as a whole (according to the oxford dictionary of philosophy). The difference is that causa means endcause: that with which an act has been started and is its end'goal'. The consequences can be interpreted as the end'goal', but an act does not necessarily have to have that end'goal' as a direct result. One thing may be torture to of prisoners to come to a victory in the end. Hedonism for instance is about pleasure, which is a direct result. I hope you see the difference.
2. Virtue ethics sets a certain predefined idea as 'the good' and therewith as the end'goal' in an act. In that sense it is the same as consequentionalism, with the only exception that it has a rulebase, defined by a leader or God which is wielded as the end'goal' (Oxford dictionary names Aristotles virtue ethics as an example for teleology). In consequentionalism it can be any odd thought that can come into a persons mind.

So, to me you are making the distinction in a wrong way. Personally I have never read or heard (my teacher is Marcus Düwell) a different explanation until I started editing the wikipedia, but I may have misunderstood of course. However, I may still be wrong. So, if you are sticking with your definitions, I would like a credible source for that. In the mean time I have given you the first source that always comes to mind and is easiest to represent: the oxford dictionary of philosophy. Please let me know your thoughts on the matter. --Faust (talk) 08:29, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

My source for the first part, the equivalence of consequentialism and teleology, is C.D. Broad's Five Types of Ethical Theories, Chapter VII, Section (5), where the term "deontological" was first coined. Broad writes: "[some theories hold that] the concepts of value are fundamental, and the concepts of obligation are definable in terms of them. Such theories may be called Teleological. E.g., it might be held that 'X is a right action' means that X is likely to produce at least as good consequences as any action open to the agent at the time. Utilitarianism, in some of its forms, would be an example of this". I see that a fragment of this is quoted in the article as it stands, but I found an online copy of the complete text for you here. I agree that hedonism is a form of consequentialist or teleological theory; at least, I think we're agreeing there, because, no offense intended, your grammar is very difficult to parse, so I'm not entirely sure what you're trying to say.

As for the trichotomy in general, the best quick source off the top of my head is the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. On the subject of Virtue Ethics in particular, it begins "Virtue ethics is currently one of three major approaches in normative ethics. It may, initially, be identified as the one that emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in contrast to the approach which emphasizes duties or rules (deontology) or that which emphasizes the consequences of actions (consequentialism). Suppose it is obvious that someone in need should be helped. A utilitarian will point to the fact that the consequences of doing so will maximise well-being, a deontologist to the fact that, in doing so the agent will be acting in accordance with a moral rule such as 'Do unto others as you would be done by' and a virtue ethicist to the fact that helping the person would be charitable or benevolent." This is also the trichotomy which all my ethics courses at university taught, and which is the standard here at Wikipedia.

--Pfhorrest (talk) 09:00, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi A Forest, I am aware of the separation that you are making. However, I know of no source that is actually calling virtue ethics non-teleological. At any rate, I know there are several positions in this and it would be best to take a neutral position. That is why I suggested to note that is at least some discussion on the category in which each individual theory is placed. Perhaps we should simply note that according to the one virtue = teleology (as well as conseq.) and that according to the other virtue is a separate category or something? It seems to me that you have a credibel source and I do too. --Faust (talk) 09:58, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

I don't see that we need to be discussing that in this article at all; maybe over at Normative ethics. But the point of contention here was whether or not divine command theory and the non-agression principle count as deontological; whether or not consequential=teleological and whether or not virtue ethics are teleological, divine command theory and the non-agression principle are none of those. They are both rules-based ethical theories, rather than character-based or outcome-based, and that is the defining feature of a deontological theory: defining rightness of action in terms of accordance to some or other rules. --Pfhorrest (talk) 10:25, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Okay, I am very much in disbelief here. Deon means duty and telos means rule. Teleology is the theory which defines rightness of action in terms of accordance to some or other rule... At least we agree on the fact that both do that.

Further: To get to the point, I think it is prudent to state that there is discussion on in what category a certain type falls. Do you agree or disagree and why?

--Faust (talk) 10:51, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

Telos does not mean "rule"; can you please back that claim up with a source? I was taught that it means "purpose" or "end", and dictionaries seem to agree: wikt:teleology and wikt:τέλος for example, and http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/teleo- as well. Teleology does not at all define rightness of action in terms of accordance to some or other rule; deontology does. Deontology and teleology are virtually antonyms; are you trying to say they are synonyms? --Pfhorrest (talk) 10:58, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

My bad concerning the rule which is endgoal, sorry. However, a goal is used a rule, leading to teleology. Also, you are incorrect in the idea of deontology. It examines both the act as well as the intention. Examining only the goal or the rule is teleology since it is, at that moment, used as a justifictation of the act. A goal used as a rule is teleology and a rule used as a goal is teleology. Deontology is something else: it has no rulebase because both parts are undefined at the beginning of the reasoning.

Again, apologies for my mixup. I just skipped a beat in the reasoning. --Faust (talk) 11:05, 4 September 2010 (UTC)

All three kinds of theories involve rules of some sort, since they're all normative theories, i.e. theories about what people ought or ought not do, i.e. theories about rules of behavior. The question is whether you ought to obey the rules put forth because those rules reflect certain kinds of character (e.g. you ought to do things which are brave, noble, charitable, etc, because they are brave, noble, etc), whether you ought to obey those rules because they achieve certain kinds of circumstances (e.g. you ought to do things which make people happy, because they make people happy), or whether you ought to obey those rules because of something about the rules themselves (e.g. you ought to act in accordance with maxims which are consistent with their universalizations, just because it would be irrational to do otherwise).

There are three things under consideration here: the motivating aspects of the actor's character, the actual act carried out, and the consequences of that act. Aretaic theories say "do whatever actions reflects these virtues", because they reflect those virtues; and consequentialist theories day "do whatever actions achieve these ends", because they achieve those ends. Deontological theories say "do these sorts of things", just because those things are the right things to do. It doesn't matter why you do them or what happens as a result." Aretaic theories care about why you do things, consequentialist theories care about what happens as a result, and deontological theories only care about what you do, not why or what happens. That's why they are described as "rule based"; following the rule is what matters, not what inspired you to follow the rule or what happened because you did.

Mind you, I've never entirely bought this division of normative theories as analytically sound myself (my personal normative ethical theory is hard to categorize within this scheme), but these are the way the theories are usually characterized, and arguing about whether or not it is the right way of characterizing them would be original research. Do you, by the way, have a link to the source you claim calls Aristotle's aretaic theory "teleological"? --Pfhorrest (talk) 02:10, 5 September 2010 (UTC)

Pfhorrest, I think the claim that Aristotle's ethical theory is at least in part teleological has been put forward by Henry Sidgwick and David Ross (among others). See: [1] (only first page, but that is enough to get an idea). But there is no consensus among ethical thinkers on this topic. Theobald Tiger (talk) 09:55, 5 September 2010 (UTC)

Thank you for that link; however, I notice that even in that article, it is asking whether Aristotle's particular ethical theory was a teleological theory or a virtue ethics (aretaic) theory, thus still maintaining the distinction between the two categories of theories. Aristotle was brought up here, as far as I can tell, as the archetype of virtue ethicists, to show him to be a teleologist and thus all of virtue ethics to be a part of teleology, rather than a separate, third category. Since this article does not seem to be attempting to merge those categories, but merely to decide on which category Aristotle's theory belongs in, I don't think it's particularly relevant to the debate here.

Not that any of this is particularly relevant to this article in the first place. I'm not sure how we got off this topic, but the original point in question was: what makes a theory deontological or not, and do divine command theory and the non-agression principle fit that criteria?

I say a theory is deontological if it doesn't care what the consequences of your actions are or why you chose to do them, it only cares what actions you actually do: you should, according to a deontological theory, do the right thing, even from ignoble motives, and even to bad consequences. "Let justice be done, though the heavens fall!" Say for example that we have a deontological theory which, like Kant's, say you should always tell the truth no matter what. One day you decide to tell the truth about something, for selfish reasons, and that has consequences which make other people very unhappy. The deontological theory would say that you did the right thing by telling the truth, even though it was for ignoble reasons and to bad ends; it would be wrong if you had lied instead, even if for noble reasons and to good ends.

I say that divine command theory and the non-aggression principle are deontological according to this definition, because they say "obeying God is inherently the right thing to do", and "aggressing against other people is inherently the wrong thing to do", without caring why you do or don't do them or what happens as a result. It is simply your duty to follow those rules no matter what or why (deon = duty).

The rest of this about Aristotle and virtue ethics and all that is completely off-topic from this article and should be taken elsewhere if we want to continue talking about it. --Pfhorrest (talk) 00:50, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

@Theobald: Aristotle talks about a telos (eudaemonia). That is what the entire term teleology is derived from...I understand that there are positions that see things differently, but those are new readings and are definitely not accepted commonly.

@Pfhorest:First off: See above, I mean: no brainer: the entire term is derived from Aristotle's theory. Second: I do not have an account there, but Theobald does. I'll quote below though. Further: I grasp your argument, but I do not think it rules out the point I made about taking down that there are different ways of viewing a certain theory, depending on your position. I will make a comment about this on your talk page, since it would be inappropriate here.

The quote is (p360, teleology): "(Greek, telos, end) The study of the ends or purposes of things. The idea that there is such a thing as the end or purpose of life is prominent in the Aristotelian view of Nature (and ethics), and then in the Cristian tradition." Reading this again I must admit it is not as clear as I took it.

I looked into some more sources and found:The Routledge states: "Ancient Greek theories are teleological because they identify virtue with the perfection of human nature."

This comes down to exactly my point: eudaemonia is a telos. Hence the term. Anyway, I am of a mind that stating there is discussion about it is the right course of action. --Faust (talk) 21:47, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Addendum: I am reading a Stanford online encyclopedia at the moment about this, which is about the only source I can find that supports your version. I am not really taking it seriously because of several remarks that are in contradiction to both the oxford dictionary and the Routledge encyclopedia. However, I felt I should notify you that I will consider it during a well deserved rest. --Faust (talk) 22:33, 6 September 2010 (UTC)

Okay, I have found a couple of sources that support the idea that there are three basic forms of normative ethics. I find none of them reliable since their usage of terms is incorrect all over the articles and most of them use the same source (the stanford), or sources that use the same source. I still think there are two versions of normative ethics, witha division in those two versions, especially because the one that is set apart (virtue e.) is the model for that which it is set apart from (teleology). However, this discussion was not about the correctness of that theory, but about the idea that at the very least there are other theories out there. I think I have proven this sufficiently with my sources already. So, does everybody agree that the separate forms of normative ethics should get a disambiguation in this article? --Faust (talk) 08:53, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

As I said above, I don't get why we are discussing this here at all, instead of at Talk:Normative ethics. This article is just about deontological theories; it's not about aretaic or consequentialist theories, and whether or not those two are the same. That is not the subject of this article; it does not take a stance on that debate either way, so it doesn't matter, we should not be discussing it here.

All that matters, the only reason we were talking about any of this at all, is:

• What makes a theory deontological? (And do you have sources to back that definition?)
• Do divine command theory and the non-aggression principle count as deontological according to that definition?

Your original contention, which got us into this mess to begin with, was that "Since both are commands they are vitues and hence teleological". You conflating aretaic and teleological theories raised red flags for me since I have never heard anyone claim that aretaic theories are a kind of teleological theories, so I mentioned it as a part of questioning your understanding of different normative ethical categories in general. Maybe you are right that there are other systems of categorization that lump aretaic and teleological theories together; but that is not the point of this discussion at all.

The point is that first jump you made: are theories based on commands aretaic theories, or deontological ones? I've been arguing that being based on commands is the defining characteristic of a deontological theory. The archetypical deontological theory is Kant's categorical imperative, and "imperative" means the very same thing as "command" (an imperative is a type of sentence which commands something, like "Clean your room!" or "Don't lie!"), so if theories based on commands aren't deontological than Kant's own theory isn't, and that's absurd. The "deon" in "deontological" likewise means "duty", which is what a valid command or imperative imparts. The first two paragraphs of this article, with three sources, nicely sum up the definition of deontological that I am familiar with, which has everything to do with rules, commands, or duties; and thus divine command theory and the non-aggression principle clearly qualify as deontological and not aretaic.

I ask again, can you please state what you consider the definition of a deontological theory to be, and cite some sources to back that up?

Thanks, --Pfhorrest (talk) 11:22, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

Okay,

First: perhaps you are right and we should address this at normative ethics, since this article should include all theories that can be seen as deontological. I would think a small mention of this dispute are welcome though.

Second: Kant, for instance, clearly states that deontology is that theory which examines both the rule, as well as the act, or: both the maxim as well as the intention. I bet you know this. The oxford dictionary of philosophy states so, for instance at the categorical imperative section (P54). Apart from that I bet you the formulation "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that is should become universal law".

Third: Perhaps a clearer picture to you might be that areatic are about the act, while consequentionalism (both examples of teleology) both use that idea as a rulebase for goals (telos). Combined they are a complete syllogism (a rule of mind (major premise) and an image/maxim (minor premisse), being a deontological formulation. The combination of the two ensure the necessity of the absence of rulebases (POV's). Perhaps this is not all that clear, but I can elaborate, but perhaps we should not do that here as you indicated.

Fourth: The command you refer to is one an actor lays upon him- or herself, sometimes believing it to be mandated by some all powerful source such as a God or law or something.

Fifth: an imperative is a standard mood of sentences used to issue requests and commands (Oxford again).

Is that useful to you in any way?

--Faust (talk) 15:00, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

I suspect that there is some kind of language confusion going on here. I'm completely unclear as to what you mean "the rule as well as the act"; and a maxim is a kind of intention (e.g. "I will not lie", thought to oneself, is a maxim), so "the maxim and the intention" doesn't make any sense to me either. Kant's categorical imperative is saying that you should act according to rules which would be self-consistent if universalized: consider both your own action according to whatever maxim, and also everyone else's hypothetical action according to that same maxim, and if there is any conflict between them, that maxim is not moral. Perhaps that is what you mean "the rule" (the universal use of that maxim) and "the act" (your own use of that maxim)?

That wording seems very unusual to me: I would call the maxim itself the rule, and say that the categorical imperative is exhorting people to act only according to rules (maxims) which would work if universalized. (e.g. if everyone acted on the maxim "I will lie", then language would lose all meaning and it would not be possible to lie, so "I will lie" is an non-universalizable, and thus immoral, maxim. Likewise "I will steal": if everyone always stole then the concept of property would be destroyed and it would not be possible to steal. Etc.).

But either way, Kant's is not the only deontological theory out there, and conformance to his categorical imperative is not the defining characteristic of deontological theories. Kant's theory says to act according to that rule which can be universalized. Deontological theories in general say "Act according to that rule which ________", where whatever fills in the blank defined that particular deontological theory apart from others. Divine command theory says "Act according to that rule which God commands", the non-aggression principle says "Act according to that rule which forbids aggression upon others", etc. The thing they all have in common is saying "Follow [this, that, or the other] rule(s), whatever the consequences", instead of "do whatever accomplishes [this, that, or the other] consequence(s)" as a teleological theory world.

I can't really parse your third point because of sentence structure and mismatched parentheses, but since it appears to be about aretaic and consequentialist theories I don't think it's really relevant to the question of what is deontology.

And I agree with your fourth and fifth points, but I don't see how those refuse the definition of deontology I was giving; it seems to be just agreeing with me. So I'm not sure why you mention it.

--Pfhorrest (talk) 22:29, 7 September 2010 (UTC)

Pfhorrest, I do not mean to be rude, but it seams that you do not know enough of the subject matter. I hope I will not go out of bounds with this, but the entire issue is that thoughts are signifiers (Jaques Lacan, all his works except the very early school work). This means that all thoughts have two parts: an image and a signal. In logic a representation is called a syllogism, which has a major premise and a minor premise. In Ethics these are called intention and maxim. Teleology is the wielding of one of the premises as a rule, by means of denying or not examining the other (and in doing so creates a 'rulebase'; a POV). So, teleology can be (roughly) separated into two groups:

1) consequentionalism (holds only a minor premise and denies the major premise (intent))

2) Areatic ethics (holds only a major premise and denies the minor premise (maxim))

NOTE: I grasp your idea of this, I have seen it before. I hope you grasp what I am trying to say (write) here. If not, it might be too specialized for the wikipedia. If that is the case, please tell me how to proceed. You clearly have more experience than I. --Faust (talk) 08:49, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

Likewise no offense intended, but I feel very much likewise that you do not seem to know much about the subject matter either. Virtually everything you say sounds like patent nonsense in the context of the philosophical terminology I am familiar with. I am not familiar with this Jaques Lacan, but from his wiki article he appears to be a fringe psychoanalyst and not a well known philosopher; the criticisms levelled at him, such as "superficial erudition" and "incoherent system of pseudo-scientific gibberish", are the kinds of criticism I feel like levelling at you, but in the interest of good faith I'm assuming that there is either a language barrier here (i.e. you use terms differently in Dutch academia than we do in English) or this is a vestige of the divergence between the analytic and continental schools of contemporary philosophy, perhaps both.

I am familiar with the concepts of signifiers (and semiotics in general), though I've never heard this "image and signal" terminology. I am very familiar with syllogisms and the major/minor premise terminology used therein; but the connection you mean to imply between that and this "image and signal" business is not clear to me. Likewise I am unclear on what connection you mean to imply between major & minor premises and "intentions" and "maxims"; are you trying to claim that an "intention" is a the major premise of an ethical syllogism (e.g. "all theft is wrong"), and a "maxim" is the minor premise of an ethical syllogism (e.g. "taking that necklace is theft"); or perhaps vice versa? I have never heard anyone use that terminology before and I cannot find any source supporting it; can you cite one please? (Other than this Lacan person). Even that terminological point aside, what do you mean "wield one of the premises as a rule, by means of denying or not examining the other"? The rest of what you just wrote hinges on that, which as far as I can tell is patent nonsense; but then many analytic philosophers consider what many continental philosophers say to be patent nonsense, so maybe this is just a philosophical culture gap making each of us sound ridiculous to the other.

I think we should wait until some people respond to the RFC I've posted here before we continue this. I don't think we're really getting anywhere. --Pfhorrest (talk) 11:34, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi Pfhorrest, I have considered the gap between educational systems, be it continental vs analytic, or otherwise as well. I do not think this fits the bill, but I do know that some differences of opinion can make the other's opinion seem ridiculous. Personally I was having trouble believing you have a bachelor's degree, especially since you have never heard of Jacques Lacan, about whom almost the entire second year is, but I realize that this is just my own frame of reference. Concerning the terms I am not lost with your usage. I recognize it as a position. The problem with that is that this just might be a little hard to swallow for you. In my defense: None of this is made up and none of this a POV. These are the only objective overviews I know of. In defense of Lacan I want to have said that not all of the above is from his hand, I assumed (stupid to do of me, sorry) that the rest would ring a bell (and I have therefore not referenced). At the very least I hope you can work out the separation the similarities between the syllogistic form and deontology from what I have said, but this is not important for this article I guess.

More to the point: What do you think is a good way to step forward in this? —Preceding unsigned comment added by Faust (talk • contribs) 18:02, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

Okay, here is a quote from the Routledge: "Deontology asserts that there are several distinct duties. Certain kinds of act are intrinsically wrong. The rightness or wrongness of any particular act is thus not (or not wholly) determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences. <<etc>>" (P172, Deontological Ethics)

I hope this satisfies you. Apart from that I am would like to state that I think you RFC concerns the wrong question. The question is we should add a disambiguation concerning if a certain theory is teleo- or deontological. Not which of those theories is correct. However, if it should come to that, you know my vote. --Faust (talk) 20:22, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

I agree with that Routledge definition entirely; that's exactly what I've been trying to say. It has been sounding like you have been disagreeing with that kind of definition the whole time. If you do agree with it, then what is it about divine command theory or the non-aggression principle that you think does not fit that definition? They both say that such-and-such is a duty, the transgression of which is intrinsically wrong, independent of the goodness of badness of its consequences.

Also, I think perhaps you misunderstood the RFC summary; I was not saying the question is which of those theories is right, but whether or not they count as deontological theories (and what definition of "deontological theory" is correct; not which theory, but what does it mean to be such a theory, what counts as such a theory?). --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:52, 8 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi Pfhorrest,

1) Your RFC requests opinions on the question if these theories ARE deontological. This leads to the question which theory one upholds. I say the RFC should be if we want to take down that a certain POV says that a theory is and another POV says it isn't.

2) The point I am arguing is this particular piece: "The rightness or wrongness of any particular act is thus not (or not wholly) determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences." Therefore it examines both the rule as well as the aim. Since the non-aggression principle and the divine command principle do not investigate the consequences AT ALL, the rules are used as 'goals' an sich, thus becoming teleology. I hope this comes across this time.

--Faust (talk) 06:59, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

Hi Faust,

• Re (1): Do you mean "which theory of deontology one upholds", i.e. what one takes the definition of deontology to be? (In other words, "which theory" in your sentence above is not referring to divine command theory [DCT] and the non-aggression principle [NAP], but to theories about how to categorize those theories, right?). So you (might) want the article to say that "deontology is either X or Y" and "according to X, DCT and NAP are deontological theories, while according to Y they are not"? If it turns out that there are two substantially different, notable and reliably sourced definitions of deontology, then I would agree; but it's looking to me, given your Routledge citation which I wholly agree with, that there is only one definition, and there is only some disagreement about its implications on categorizing these two theories (DCT and NAP).
• Re (2): I agree wholeheartedly with that passage you quote as the defining characteristic of a deontological theory. However, it sounds to me that you somehow take it to mean the opposite of what it clearly seems to me to mean. It is saying that according to a deontological theory, the rightness or wrongness of an act is NOT determined by its consequences; yet you seem to be saying that because DCT and NAP do not consider consequences in their determination of the rightness or wrongness of an action (which Routledge says deontological theories do not), that they are thus not deontological theories? Let me formalize what I am hearing symbolically, so we can be extra clear here (if you're not familiar with the symbols used here, "iff" means "if and only if", i.e. logical equivalence, and "~" means negation):
  • Let D(x) = "theory x is deontological"
  • Let C(x) = "theory x considers the rightness or wrongness of an action to be determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences"
  • Let R = "D(x) iff ~C(x)"

    (paraphrasing the Routledge passage you quote above: a theory is deontological if and only if it does not consider the rightness or wrongness of an action to be determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences)

  • Let x = DCT or NAP
  • We can then infer from R & ~C(x) that D(x)

    (that is, given the Routledge definition and your agreement that DCT and NAP "do not investigate the consequences AT ALL", we should conclude that DCT and NAP are deontological theories)

  • But you are inferring from R & ~C(x) that ~D(x)

    (that is, you somehow conclude, opposite of what logically follows, that DCT and NAP are not deontological theories)

Hopefully this clarifies why what you are asserting sounds so bizarre to me. --Pfhorrest (talk) 09:50, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

Dear All, I agree with everything Pfhorrest has said before on this talk page. We all agree that the point of contention is whether or not the Divine Command Theory (DCT) and the Non-Agression Principle (NAP) count as deontological. The main distinctions that are made in normative ethical theory have been outlined by Pfhorrest above and most if not all reliable sources make the same elementary distinctions, as far as I am aware. We all agree upon the Routledge definition of deontology, quoted by Faust. I have a few additional comments.

1. Our point of contention does not "lead to the question which theory one upholds". The one thing that is required is that we agree upon the definitions, provided by reliable sources, of what constitutes deontological theories (whether or not we personally believe those definitions to be correct).
2. Faust's use of the abbreviation 'POV' is confusing. The reason for that is that he seems to use the term 'POV' not only in the encyclopedic sense, but also (at several occasions on this talk page) to qualify the theories or definitions that are to be found in reliable sources. He even seems to use 'POV' as a general synonym for 'opinion'. But that is not the way we are supposed to use the term here. All of us hold opinions of some sort, and every reliable source makes choices by distinguishing between what its editors consider to be well-established and what to be still under dispute. 'POV' and 'NPOV' with respect to our encyclopedic activities are terms that are merely used to clarify that we have to represent what reliable sources tell us about a given subject (whether or not we agree with the content of those sources). To qualify an authoritative or reliable source as 'POV' is another matter entirely, and though I do not object to questioning the reliability of a source as such, this kind of activity falls in large part outside the scope of wikipedia, especially when the reliability of sources in a specific area is widely acknowledged. Ethical theories are disputed heavily and everywhere, but, as far as I am aware, there are at least some widely acclaimed sources that provide an overview of ethical theories.
3. The mere fact that an ethical system is based upon rules or makes use of a set of rules, does not make that system teleological (as Pfhorrest has explained before). Everyone may contend, if he so wishes, that each and every rules-based ethical system is ipso facto teleological, but as long as reliable sources do not consider this contention as a well-established theory and adapt their definitions accordingly, we have no choice but to follow those sources in their (perhaps mistaken or old-fashioned) practice of making the well-known distinctions.
4. Since DCT and NAP both say that such-and-such is a duty, the transgression of which is intrinsically wrong, independent of the goodness or badness of its consequences (to borrow a phrase used by Pfhorrest), I think the two theories or principles ought to be categorized as deontological.

Theobald Tiger (talk) 14:46, 9 September 2010 (UTC)

Okay, the point of arguing has come and gone. The thing is that I am suggesting that deontology is only that which examins both maxim and intent, as is shown by several creditable sources. Pfhorrest is of the opinion that deontology is that which does not examine the maxim only. Both are valid theories. I will not leave my idea since calling something a duty while it is wielded as a goal doesn't make it a duty. I think that the error occurs when a reasoning is applied to show that wielding a goal allows for a double standard (hence the problem with POV's). This would show that the rule (intent) is more important than the goal. Once that has been concluded the rule thereby becomes the goal, but this is merely a repeating of steps. As is this message to you two. So, the question is not if what I am saying is valid, but if we should place it here. Please, argue this point and do not start your revisionistic reasoning again! —Preceding unsigned comment added by Faust (talk • contribs) 17:04, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

You have completely sidestepped the track of the conversation above. We were making progress and you have now reversed us.

There are not multiple "theories" (if by that you mean "definitions") of deotontology, at least not according to any sources anyone has cited. (You have not quoted your source for this "maxim and intent" language you keep using; what, exactly, does it say in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy on page 54?) Either way, we (you and the rest of us) had all agreed on the Routledge definition you quoted, and were arguing interpretation of it as to the inclusion of DCT and NAP within the extension of that definition. Unless you want to backpeddle and disagree with your quoted Routledge definition, I think we should continue using that.

Back to where we were: I formally outlined why DCT and NAP seem to me to clearly fit the Routledge definition, and why your reasoning contrary looked fallacious. I asked for clarification if my understanding of your reasoning was incorrect. Can you please point out where in my formalized outline I strayed from what you meant to say? Do you disagree that

• "a theory is deontological if and only if it does not consider the rightness or wrongness of an action to be determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences"

is an accurate paraphrase of

• "Deontology asserts that [...] The rightness or wrongness of any particular act is thus not (or not wholly) determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences"

? And if you agree that those mean the same thing, do you agree that DCT and NAP "do not consider the rightness or wrongness of an action to be determined by the goodness or badness of its consequences"? You wrote before that they "do not investigate the consequences AT ALL" (your words), so I'm pretty sure you agree with that part at least; so your disagreement must lie in interpretation of the Routledge definition. --Pfhorrest (talk) 23:24, 13 September 2010 (UTC)

Look, Pfhorrest, please regain your philosophical distance.

Please do not condescend to me. I am being perfectly philosophical. I presented a formalization of what I thought you were saying, and asked you to point out where I misunderstood you. You are the one who keeps returning to personal issues of "philosophical distance" and your problems from nl.wiki which I honestly do not care about in the least.

Theobald is constantly arguing his POV and you ar following him willingly (especially in his painting me as 'the dragon' and 'hubristic' or 'arrogant', while he clearly voices his disinterest in the content of the encyclopedia, as long as my ideas are not in them in emails to me).

I considered you arrogant on my own from your first few posts. You are extremely condescending and continue to be in this very post. I have kept open the possibility that they perhaps teach you very different things in continental philosophy schools, or that there is a language barrier; you, on the other hand, keep accusing me of not actually having the degree I do. You are the one losing "philosophical distance", just as you are the one POV-pushing; stop projecting your issues onto other people.

Please, consider the fact that what you are saying negates the examination of the act: the maxim. Your version examines only the rule. That is the clear difference. What you two are doing is a scandalous motivating of your POV's, calling that progress is just too much.

Debating the actual philosophy of what is the correct way of determining right and wrong actions is not why I am here; wikipedia is not a forum. We were making progress in reaching consensus on the content of this encyclopedia, in that you had posited a definition and everyone else had agreed, and then I was asking for a clear, precise formulation of how you were interpreting that definition, and you refuse to answer that question, instead coming back to personal issues and your paranoia about people from nl.wiki corrupting us here on en.wiki or whatever.

The most scandalous to me is this remark of yours: "You have not quoted your source for this "maxim and intent" language you keep using; what, exactly, does it say in the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy on page 54?" If you honestly do not know the maxim and intent formulation, I will not believe you have a degree in philosophy any more..... Really, I cannot take your arguments serious any more with statements like that...

I know all three formulations of Kant's Categorical Imperative very well, if that's what you're talking about, but the Categorical Imperative does not define what makes a theory deontological, it is one single (albeit archetypical) deontological theory. Is it really that hard for you to open up your ODP and type what it says on page 54, if that is such a definitive backing of the POV you are pushing?

However, since I do not content your POV as being a respectable position in philosophy I am only suggesting the difference should be noted. Perhaps another page should be more fitting, but somehow you have evaded this question the hole time.

I have yet to see evidence that there is more than one definition of deontology, as every source you have quoted agrees with the definition I am going by, and you refuse to quote the one which you claim is different.

So, I have purposefully ignored the 'progress' you two made above since what you take to be about deontology is about areatic ethics (and hence about teleology (in the narrow sense).

The progress being made which I referred to was between you and me, or your position and mine; not me and anybody else over you. Again, I refer to progress in reaching consensus on this encyclopedia. We (you and I) had agreed on something (the Routledge definition), begun a partial consensus, and I was trying to understand why and how we were disagreeing on the remainder; and then you disappeared for a while and came back with this complete non-sequitur to that conversation. Do you still agree with the Routledge definition or not? Do you still agree that DCT and NAP "do not investigate the consequences AT ALL"? Answer that and we continue to move forward.

Please, get back to the only point worth our time: should we take down the separate definitions here or elsewhere?

Again: you have yet to demonstrate that there IS another notable other definition; the only definition you have sourced is the one that I agree with. If there is another notable definition, then yes, they should be noted here; but at this point I severely doubt that. And aside from that, that is not the main point of this conversation at all: this conversation began because you wanted DCT and NAP removed from the page. So the point is: Do DCT and NAP count as deontological? To answer that, we have to ask: what kinds of theories count as deontological? If there turn out to be multiple notable answers to that latter question then your point is valid, but you have yet to present any compelling evidence thereof.

As said: i will be out for a few days. --Faust (talk) 13:09, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

When you return, please address my questions and get back on track with building consensus rather than another non-sequitur like this. --Pfhorrest (talk) 21:02, 14 September 2010 (UTC)

RfC response

While I hate to interrupt the all night dorm-room philosophical bull session above, please allow me to address the RfC topic. Both the Divine Command Theory (DCT) and the Non-Agression Principle (with the apt acronym NAP) are deontological as they are expressed in the article. The confusion above (as best I can tell from reading the first half - didn't care to get through all of it) is arising because you all have forgotten that any theory of ethics contains an intentional component, and any ethics theoretician is trying to set up normative standards for intention as much as normative standards for behavior. So, with respect to the DCT, the theory clearly intends to suggest that people treat God's commands as inherently right for no other reason than that God commanded them. One could turn it into a teleological theory by claiming, instead, that one should treat God's commands as inherently right so that one can get into heaven; One could turn it into an aretaic theory by claiming that one should treat God's commands as inherently right because it is the quality of a virtuous man to do so. But the goal of the various authors who put this idea forth (as I understand them) is to guide people away from the teleological and aretaic intention-structures towards deontological intention-structures.

The same, incidentally, applies to Aristotle's theory. Eudemonia was not the goal of his ethics, it was a consequence. Aristotle would not have considered someone who pursued happiness as a goal to be virtuous; he would suggest that living a life of arete would produce happiness without further effort. --Ludwigs2 17:08, 30 September 2010 (UTC)

Another response to the Rfc

Consider this quote from the article:

However, there is a difference between deontological ethics and moral absolutism.[5] Deontologists who are also moral absolutists believe that some actions are wrong no matter what consequences follow from them. Immanuel Kant, for example, argued that the only absolutely good thing is a good will, and so the single determining factor of whether an action is morally right is the will, or motive of the person doing it. If they are acting on a bad maxim, e.g. "I will lie", then their action is wrong, even if some good consequences come of it. Non-absolutist deontologists, such as W. D. Ross, hold that the consequences of an action such as lying may sometimes make lying the right thing to do.

If the preceding quote is accurate, then clearly we have deontologists (e.g. Kant) who are moral absolutists, and others (e.g. Ross) who aren't. Supposing, for the moment, that all moral absolutists are deontologists, it makes perfectly good sense to discuss moral absolutism as a subdivision of deontology. Yet it would only take one example of a moral absolutist who is not a deontologist to break that supposition. And it shouldn't be too far to look to find one!

So I conclude that only (further) confusion can result from combining the two articles. yoyo (talk) 16:52, 4 October 2011 (UTC)

First sentence

I'm not at all happy with the first sentence which defines deontology as an approach to morality grounded in rules. Utilitarians do exactly this ('the greatest happiness for the geatest number') yet are the complete opposite of being deontology. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 82.47.165.142 (talk) 21:09, 18 December 2010 (UTC)

I concur. (I have broken out your bold phrase First sentence as a sub-heading.) yoyo (talk) 16:52, 4 October 2011 (UTC)

Merging Duties and deontological ethics

Someone else put the merge tag on that article, which is more of an essay, but I would agree that Duties and deontological ethics needs to either be merged into here or deleted, as it appears the topic can better be dealt with here. Dennis Brown (talk) 22:18, 20 December 2011 (UTC)

Agreed. --Pfhorrest (talk) 03:44, 21 December 2011 (UTC)

Ambiguous parse tree

I already wrote a weird note this morning at Talk:Informed consent about how I'm slowly beginning to hate these sentences.

What we have:

Depending on the system of deontological ethics under consideration, a moral obligation may arise from an external or internal source, such as a set of rules inherent to the universe (ethical naturalism), religious law, or a set of personal or cultural values (any of which may be in conflict with personal desires).

How I tried to expand this for my own notes:

Depending on the system of deontological ethics under consideration, a moral obligation may arise from:

• an external or internal source, such as:
  • a set of rules inherent to the universe — ethical naturalism
• religious law
• a set of personal or cultural values

— (any of which may be in conflict with personal desires).

Here's my problem: it's entirely unclear at the syntactic level whether "any of which" binds to only the last bullet point, or all of them collectively (at the semantic level, my impulse is to bind "any" globally, but it's not properly up to me as a reader, because I'm supposed to bind it to what the [missing] source substantiates). Without the word or in the final bullet point, then the binding becomes global of necessity. — MaxEnt 18:07, 21 May 2021 (UTC)

CODA.

How I solved this for my own notes what to break the "any" clause into a separate sentence:

Any of these arising obligations may be in conflict with personal desires.

It's a bit ghastly, but it decides the binding in no uncertain terms. — MaxEnt 18:10, 21 May 2021 (UTC)

Gah! Now that I have tamed the syntactic morass, I started to read it for semantics alone, and this is ugly too.

Alternate parse tree I did not, at first, construct:

Depending on the system of deontological ethics under consideration, a moral obligation may arise from:

• an external or internal source, such as:
  • a set of rules inherent to the universe — ethical naturalism
  • religious law
  • a set of personal or cultural values
• any of which may be in conflict with personal desires.

The reason I did not go in this direction is that I noticed "religious law" and "cultural values" coming down the pike, and reasonable decided they should not be subordinate to "external or internal source", as these are clearly not internal.

I could have concluded the same about the bigger mouthful, "a set of rules inherent to the universe (ethical naturalism)" except for two things: with the parenthetical dangling behind, my eyes decided to skip ahead and look for something with less gristle; and semantically, I don't entirely assign "rules inherent to the universe" to the external on an exclusive basis; as human biology is constrained by rules of the universe, I would argue that rules of the universe are therefore inherent in our biology, and that biological introspection could potentially be an avenue toward insight (odds are perhaps low, but potentially).

In my weird note from early today, I argued that no-one really gives a shit whether this kind of compactified sentence is correct or not—in a deep way—because of multitudinous textbook traumas inflicted by the Educational Industrial System during our formative adolescent years.

For my Wikipedia, not good enough. Let's try to do better. It doesn't need to be like this.

Where I finally wound up for my own notes:

Depending on the system of deontological ethics under consideration, a moral obligation may arise from:

• a set of rules inherent to the universe — ethical naturalism
• personal values
• cultural values, such as:
  • religious law.

Any of these moral obligations, whether arising internally or externally, may be in conflict with personal desires.

— MaxEnt 18:27, 21 May 2021 (UTC)

Hi MaxEnt, how about a modification of the second-last example: "any of which may be in conflict with personal desires."

Rather than bulleting or making a new sentence, just de-indent the last phrase. And do note that by dropping the parens, you are changing the quotation.

Depending on the system of deontological ethics under consideration, a moral obligation may arise from:

• an external or internal source, such as:
  • a set of rules inherent to the universe — ethical naturalism
  • religious law
  • a set of personal or cultural values

any of which may be in conflict with personal desires.

Whatever you choose to do, make sure that the blockquote is verbatim of what the author states.--Quisqualis (talk) 18:46, 21 May 2021 (UTC)

Requested move 19 July 2021

The following is a closed discussion of a requested move. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. Editors desiring to contest the closing decision should consider a move review after discussing it on the closer's talk page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

The result of the move request was: moved. (closed by non-admin page mover) Lennart97 (talk) 09:34, 27 July 2021 (UTC)

---

Deontological ethics → Deontology – As you can see from NGRAMS and Google Scholar results, "deontology" is much more common term for this concept, also being more concise. The Google Scholar and Google Books results make it clear that the word "deontology" pretty much exclusively refers to the school of ethics. "Deontology" already redirects to this article. (t · c) buidhe 12:27, 19 July 2021 (UTC)

I agree. "Deontology" should be the main title and "Deontological ethics" should redirect there. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:56, 19 July 2021 (UTC)

Support, but note that the SEP article is titled "Deontological Ethics". (There may be a reason.) Srnec (talk) 01:49, 24 July 2021 (UTC)

SEP I assume is Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Yes, but that's to do with the way they categorise their articles... the URL note uses the phrase ethics-deontological rather than either. Andrewa (talk) 08:30, 27 July 2021 (UTC)

• Support. Seems a no-brainer to me. (And I do have an ethics major buried in my degree somewhere long ago.) Andrewa (talk) 08:30, 27 July 2021 (UTC)

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Further examples of deontological decisions

In Christianity the ten commandments are deontological decisions in life where we cannot break the rules despite negative consequences arising. For instance if our father is a criminal, we still have to respect him and love him, even though he might commit more crimes if he is not arrested. The real decisions are then of course to not do what is in the Bible, when the consequences are definitely evil even if this is deontological-immoral.

Another example is gender transition for religious reasons. This is because in monotheistic religions based on the Bible, the marriage is a sacred union between man and woman. The cultures require transition to fulfil moral and religious duty and not transitioning would be entering gay lifestyle and same-sex bonding. The transition is a statement of inner peace with ones religion and one self as the opposite gender within. Changing the outside to reflect the within is an integrity that is demanded for moral life. In the Bible same-sex bonding is not very good and thus deontological-immoral. It is a question of integrity of the person within and their looks that change.